

HISTORY'S LONG SHADOW: PERSISTENCE OF LONG DURÉE POLITICAL IDENTITIES IN UKRAINE

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Abstract: I demonstrate that certain types of formal institutions leave a *cultural* legacy by creating political attitudes and behaviors that can persist for a surprisingly long time even in the face of hostile material and institutional environments. Making use of a natural experiment of history, a partition of a homogenous population of ethnic Ukrainians between Austrian and Russian empires, I show how differences in political preferences that came about as a result of a historical accident have persisted over the course of several centuries. I record contemporary differences in political attitudes and behaviors in a survey of over 1,600 individuals residing within 15 miles of a long-defunct imperial border. Residents of the two survey strata differ primarily on attitudes toward Russia, historically the key issue of contention in the region, and in their voting behavior. This paper suggests a corrective to the way we think about causes of political behavior and effectiveness of institutional reform.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Mass public protests in Ukraine in the autumn and winter of 2013/14 that led to regime change, Russia's annexation of Crimea, and civil conflict exposed substantial regional differences in public preferences among Ukrainians. At the root of most disagreements lay differences in attitudes toward Russia and Europe and competing interpretations of recent Soviet history. This paper examines the historical causes of these disagreements. Leveraging a natural experiment of history that divided a homogenous population of western Ukrainians between two different empires for one and a half centuries I demonstrate how historical political identities created in the second half of the 19th/first quarter of the 20th century have persisted through the Soviet period and continue to shape political attitudes and behavior in the present. Comparing communities that are located *within 15 miles* of the historical Austrian-Russian imperial border that has been defunct for almost a century I show how contemporary residents of former Austrian settlements are considerably more anti-Russian than their immediate neighbors in former Russian areas. More broadly, this paper demonstrates how historical political identities continue to shape contemporary behavior.

Durable historical identities are not unique to Ukraine. They are among the most understudied causes of contemporary variation in political and economic attitudes and behavior in developing and developed countries. This paper is a call for greater theoretical and empirical attention to the influence of historical political identities and to the study of how political identities are created, how they persist and disappear. It is a rejoinder to what is now a burgeoning literature on colonial legacies (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson 2001, Easterly and Levine 2003, Banerjee and Iyer 2005, Slater 2010, Mahoney 2010, Woodberry 2012, Lee and Schultz 2012).

However, unlike most existing contributions to this literature that explore path dependent evolution of formal institutions, I focus on preservation of *political identities* within tightly-knit social networks after formal institutions that originally gave rise to these identities disappear.

Eastern European states—wedged as they are in a precarious position between major powers to the west and east—make for a fascinating historical laboratory where institutional variation is often the product of an exogenous shock of foreign conquest. There is now a growing literature in political science and economics on the effects of disruptions wrought by imperial powers (Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006, Becker et al. 2011, Darden forthcoming), Nazi conquest (Acemoglu et al. 2011, Grosfeld et al. 2013), and Communist regimes (Wittenberg 2006, Pop-Eleches and Tucker forthcoming) all focusing specifically on Eastern Europe. This paper is in conversation with existing literature but is distinct from it insofar as my dependent variable measures attitudes toward Russia and Europe, the research design leverages a natural experiment of history, and the measurement strategy is built around a unique survey that I designed and implemented. While others, notably Keith Darden (forthcoming), have studied political identities in western Ukraine, this is the first study that explores contemporary variation in political attitudes and behavior between communities that were formerly part of Austrian and Russian empires.

This paper advances and tests a theory explaining how durable political identities are created and why they persist. The article opens with an exposition of the theory. It then introduces the natural experiment on which the research design is built. Next, I describe the historical treatments that gave rise to differences in political identities in otherwise identical populations. The bulk of the paper is dedicated to the

exploration of empirical findings. In the discussion section, I engage with alternative explanations for the observed variation in political attitudes, and the article concludes with a discussion of the broader implications of this argument.

II. THEORY

Two competing strands of theorizing define scholarly work on political attitudes and identities. According to what has long been a dominant view, which is expressed masterfully in John Zaller's work on public opinion (Zaller 1992), political attitudes are ever changeable, influenced as they are by fluctuations in elite opinion and changes in political messages. According to this argument, most individuals are highly sensitive to contextual and moral cues when formulating political opinions, and even highly knowledgeable and ideological individuals change their attitudes quite readily when confronted with a barrage of factual or moral information that consistently runs contrary to their prior opinions.

The alternative view posits that at least some types of political attitudes are extremely stable and subject to very little change. For instance, ideological self-placement on the liberal-conservative scale and some partisan identities have been shown to be highly stable not only within a life-course but also across different generations within the same family (Hyman 1959, Jennings and Niemi 1974, Sears and Funk 1999, Zuckerman et al. 2007). Likewise, scholars have demonstrated that religious and racial attitudes persist inter-generationally at surprisingly high levels (Bengtson et al. 2009, Sears 1983). Other work in this tradition (Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006) has argued that resistance against an external occupying power is well predicted by the content of that population's first wave of schooling,

suggesting that certain political identities and resultant behaviors might persist largely unchanged for hundreds of years.

Persistence of political, religious, or moral attitudes across a life-course and inter-generationally appears to be an odd notion from the perspective of much of social science. As material and political environments change it seems reasonable to expect individuals to update their attitudes accordingly, even if with a lag. Even in areas of political activity that most individuals have little direct experience with, like foreign policy or institutional design, one would expect ordinary citizens to follow the lead of mass media and elites in revising attitudes as circumstances change. At the same time and viewed from the perspective of political and social psychology, the fact that some attitudes are extraordinarily stable should not come as that much of a surprise. There is broad consensus that individuals commonly resort to cognitive shortcuts and informational cues based on certain guiding principles (Downs 1957, Lewis 1969, Sperber 1996). The effort of having to weigh the costs and benefits of every decision would otherwise be overwhelming. The source of these cognitive shortcuts is generally poorly understood. It seems that some of these cognitive scripts might be extremely durable.

Group identities are the most likely source of cognitive shortcuts and resultant political attitudes and behaviors. From evolutionary biology to social anthropology there is a consensus that groups are basic building blocks of society (Gould 1977, Leonardelli et al. 2010, Brown 2004). Groups are structured around exclusion of outsiders, which means that group identity is by its very nature exclusionary of those who do not satisfy certain physical, ideological, cultural, or material traits. While we

know that identities are malleable social constructions (Barth 1970, Laitin 1998, Brubaker 2004), dominant group identities change only glacially, as otherwise groups would fail to provide meaningful social anchorage. It is likely that from a perspective of any given group member, especially salient group identities do not alter at all over an individual life time absent a major shock that would weaken intra-group bonds.

Most individuals are members of many different groups—national, ethnic, linguistic, religious, professional, and others—some of them perhaps with competing norms of behavior. Different group-rooted cognitive shortcuts become salient in different contexts (Posner 2007). For instance, soccer fans will rally around a national identity at an international match and around a class or local identity at a friendly match between two clubs from the same city. However, not all groups are created equal. Evidence suggests that groups that are able to transcend the constraints of daily social interactions by creating a common ideological bond, an “imagined community” (Anderson 1983), between individuals that are never likely to meet in person are especially powerful in shaping behavior. Richard Schweder, a cultural anthropologist, has argued convincingly that transcendent group identities are so very powerful because they allow members of the group to associate themselves with something bigger than an individual struggle for survival and thus to deny the limits of mortality (Schweder 1991). In short, salient transcendent group identities are likely to be an especially powerful source of behavioral cues.

The key hypothesis that I test in this paper seeks to adjudicate between studies on attitude change (e.g. Zaller 1992) that describe political preferences as highly changeable and scholarship influenced by social psychology claiming that attitudes

and behaviors rooted in partisan and religious identities are extremely durable (e.g. Jennings et al. 2009). In order to find out how durable political identities really are I ask whether there is any evidence that two different identities instilled in otherwise identical populations at the height of 19th century nation building might have survived into the present even though for the past 70 years these populations have been subject to identical material and institutional influences. Translating this into the empirics of the Ukrainian case, this hypothesis looks as follows:

H1: If Ukrainians residing to either side of the Austrian-Russian imperial border, which became defunct in 1918, still today exhibit different political preferences and behaviors then that must be evidence that certain political identities can persist intergenerationally.

Evidence of contemporary divergences in political attitudes and behavior in settlements situated on different sides of a defunct imperial border might not be sufficient to demonstrate conclusively that persistent group identities are at the root of these differences. These differences might be due to some unobservable variation between the two populations. Although I control for unobservable variables via a quasi-experimental design, the argument I advance would be strengthened if my findings conformed with other testable implications of the “identity persistence theory.” One fundamental implication from the studies of intergenerational persistence of political and religious identities is that older and younger generations must have similar political attitudes (Jennings et al. 2009, Rico and Jennings 2012). Notably, this view goes against much conventional literature stressing how older and younger generations are extremely different from one another when it comes to political attitudes and engagement (e.g. Putnam 2001). Building on the observation that intergenerational stability in political attitudes is evidence of persistent political identities I formulate the second hypothesis:

H2: If political attitudes and behavior are stable across different generations in the populations under study that demonstrates that historical political identities have persisted in these populations.

To demonstrate that powerful political identities are capable of surprising persistence is important in itself, especially given that in recent decades some of the fundamental tenets of persistence theories have come under attack (Conover 1991, Niemi and Hepburn 1995, Sapiro 2004). And yet, the reader might inquire about the mechanisms by which political identities are transmitted across generations. The literature on political socialization is largely silent on transmission mechanisms, although it is generally understood that families and schools play a crucial role in shaping formative political attitudes (e.g. Jennings et al. 2009). I explore the processes behind identity transmission in detail elsewhere using a better-suited set of survey data than the one that I work with in this paper. I hypothesize that political identities can persist even if they run contrary to dominant institutional and material influences if social networks within which these identities are embedded remain intact. By this logic, individuals who are better integrated into community networks are more likely to be the carriers of the dominant political identity. Having said that, the survey that I draw on in this paper does contain some data on strength of community links. For instance, I know where respondents were born, how long their family has resided in the area, and whether the settlement where they live now is large or small. On the basis of these data I am able to formulate the following hypotheses about identity transmission mechanisms and test them against the available empirics:

H3a: If individuals live in a village, a type of settlement with a smaller and tighter community network than a city, then they should be more likely to conform to the dominant political identity.

H3b: If individuals live in the same settlement their whole life, then they should be better integrated into the local community network and therefore more likely to conform to the dominant political identity.

H3c: If a family has lived in the same area for several generations, then its members are likely to be better integrated into the local community network and therefore more likely to conform to the dominant political identity.

III. NATURAL EXPERIMENT

The experimental method has been lauded as an effective way to test for causal relationships while avoiding the pitfalls of unobserved covariates and endogenous causation (Gerber et al. 2004, Przeworski 2007). However, for a study to qualify as an experiment, exposure to the causal mechanism, or ‘treatment assignment,’ must be random, or in the case of a natural experiment ‘as if’ random. For this study to meet that criterion I would need to demonstrate that the placement of the Austrian-Russian imperial border was a product of random forces unconnected to pre-existing natural, ethnic, religious, or cultural boundaries and that Ukrainians who came to be divided between Austrian and Russian empires were essentially identical prior to the partitions of Poland.

Historians of Polish partitions agree that the placement of the imperial border was a product of an accident of history (e.g. Lukowski 1999, Wandycz 1974). The process by which the imperial border was drawn was haphazard because a faulty map was used at international negotiations leading up to the partitions. A segment of the new Austrian-Russian border in the northeast followed an existing county boundary within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but a substantial stretch of the border was supposed to fall along the Podgórze river (shown as a dotted line on Map 1),

which does not exist in reality. Austrian troops arriving on the scene faced a dilemma: “The only alternatives were the Seret [to the west], or the Zbrucz, about twenty miles further to the east. Joseph [II of Austria], inspecting his new prize in August 1773, was much taken by the fertility of the area: the Zbrucz it would be” (Lukowski 1999: 89). As a result, a stretch of territory about 150 miles long and 20 miles wide that under the treaty was meant to go to Russia ended up in Austria. More generally, Wandycz notes that “the newly drawn borders [in their entirety] corresponded to neither historical, ethnic, economic, nor geographical criteria... the determining factor was the balance of power” (Wandycz 1974: 11).

[MAP 1]

Ukrainians who suddenly found themselves divided between two different states in the late 18th century had resided in the area since at least the time of the earliest chronicles in the 900s. The Rus’ people—a historical name for ethnic Ukrainians—made up 70-80% of the population of what were about to become imperial borderlands. They had lived under Polish control since the mid-14th century as feudal serfs to Polish gentry. Since the late 16th century, most Rus’ in Poland practiced the Greek Catholic faith—a form of Eastern Orthodox rite, which recognizes the administrative primacy of the Vatican—and were highly immobile due to limitations of serfdom. Unlike their contemporaries in Bohemia or Hungary, at the time of the partitions Rus’ did not yet have political entrepreneurs who would mobilize them as a national group (Sysyn 1985). Few detailed historical statistics survive describing the condition of Rus’ in pre-partition Poland; however, a close reading of secondary historical sources suggests no plausible reason why Rus’ who ended up in the Austrian empire should have been any different from their next door neighbors who found themselves under Russian tutelage.

IV. HISTORICAL TREATMENTS

Political identities that are a product of deep historical legacies are the dependent variable in this project. The variation to be explained is one of different levels in contemporary support for Ukrainian nationalism and, consequently, widely divergent attitudes toward Russia, historically Ukraine's cultural brethren and aggressive neighbor to the east. To identify deeper historical causes of this contemporary divergence in identities I focus on political processes that originally shaped nationalist sentiment and perceptions of how one's national community relates to other groups.

Historical communities were “treated” via exposure to modern institutions that had identity building as their goal. Identity building treatments take time to mature and to produce durable effects. The speed and effectiveness of the identity construction process varies depending on state capacity and the type of institution that is affecting change. When state capacity is low and contact hours between elite agents of identity construction and the public are few, identity building takes longer. Twentieth century institutions—like schools and political parties—were considerably more effective at identity building than traditional 19th century institutions like churches and reading societies. As a result, successful identity construction projects took longer in the 19th century than they did in the 20th. A corollary of this point is that in instances where 19th century identity building processes were incomplete, they were superseded by complimentary or competing identity construction projects in the 20th.

It is therefore helpful to think of identity construction as a composite process: it begins with the arrival of modernity in the 19th century and continues into the 20th for as long as political institutions make conscious efforts to construct a distinctive political identity. An identity-building treatment can be considered complete when the population that was subject to the treatment is conscious of its status as a distinct political group, seeks autonomy/independence from other political groups, and votes, strictly along group lines where there is opportunity to vote. Whether a 19th century historical political identity remains dominant or is superseded by a more recent one depends on whether identity construction was completed in the 19th century. Only in the Austrian empire was the identity building treatment completed by the time that the European empires collapsed at the conclusion of World War I—there subsequent attempts to shape political identities were largely ineffective. By contrast, in Russian imperial territories—where the 19th century state was partially unwilling and partially unable to create a durable political identity—early 20th century identity building projects shaped political attitudes and behavior that are still in evidence today.

Modernity arrived in what is today western Ukraine starting in the mid-19th century. Prior to that, this area was ruled under neo-feudal arrangements and all political identities, insofar as they existed, were local and situational. Institutional carriers of the modern political tradition in this rural and therefore institutionally poor environment were churches starting in the early 19th century¹ and later schools, reading societies, newspapers, and eventually political parties—these are the usual suspects in the project of identity construction (Weber 1976, Anderson 1983, Gellner 1983, Posen 1993, Hroch 2000, Wittenberg 2012, Darden forthcoming).

¹ I consider churches to be modern institutions insofar as they work in tandem with the state and serve as a parallel arm of state administration.

It is a mistake to set special store by any one institution when studying the historical process of identity construction. All locally-available institutions—and it bears stressing that rural areas have a sparse institutional landscape—that are directed by state authorities and are carriers of modernity will have an important impact on identity building, albeit different institutions will be important at different types. Churches, schools, reading societies, newspapers, and political parties all played their part in imprinting a state-sponsored political identity on their members in the context of western Ukraine. Churches had a more important role earlier in the identity building process when the peasantry was largely illiterate, whereas schools came to the fore much later as literacy levels rose and the state was able to penetrate more effectively into the countryside.

In the Austrian possessions, the identity-building process was completed by 1918. At the turn of the 20th century, only the smallest of the three main Ukrainian political parties did not call openly for independence for Ukrainian territories in the Austrian Empire (Magosci 1996: 448). When the opportunity for independence presented itself at the collapse of the Habsburg Empire in 1918, Ukrainians of eastern Galicia were quick to seize it, declaring an independent Western Ukrainian Republic. That entity was conquered by the Polish military in 1919, but the Ukrainian national movement did not let up. It went underground and was able to successfully organize a Ukrainian boycott of the 1922 Polish general election (*ibid*: 588). During World War II, Ukrainian nationalists sided with the Nazis for a time against the Soviet Union in a false hope that Germany would tolerate an independent Ukrainian state (*ibid*: 626). In short, a strong independentist movement was in evidence among Ukrainians of

Austria already in the first quarter of the 20th century, and it treated all potential aggressors, but especially Russia, with great suspicion. This independentist movement survived five decades of Soviet rule to reemerge with new strength in the first post-Soviet election of 1991, the “Orange Revolution” of 2004, and, most notably, in the anti-Yanukovych protests and subsequent regime change in 2013-14. Ukrainians of the historical Austrian borderlands were at the forefront throughout these events seeking to bring about a break with Ukraine’s pro-Russian past.

That independentist movement was nurtured by Austrian authorities in an attempt to set up a Ukrainian bulwark against the double threat of external Russian aggression and local Polish secessionism. Early in the 19th century, the Austrian state used the Greek Catholic church, which catered exclusively to Ukrainian subjects of the Habsburg crown, to build a distinctive Ukrainian political identity designed to serve Vienna’s interests. In 1781, Habsburgs granted the Greek Catholic Church same extensive rights as Roman Catholicism (Magosci 1996: 398). Greek Catholic priests were educated at state-run seminaries and housed and salaried at the expense of the state. Austrian authorities were also eager to promote the Ukrainian vernacular: by 1848, the Austrian governor of Galicia was funding a Ukrainian-language newspaper, and that year 155 titles in Ukrainian were printed across the empire (*ibid*: 413). The 1867 Constitution guaranteed equal rights to all national communities of Austria-Hungary, and the following year a Ukrainian educational society Prosvita was set up by Ukrainian elites for the Ukrainian peasantry and quickly spread its network of reading clubs, choirs and theatre groups, as well as lending societies and cooperatives across eastern Galicia. The number of Prosvita reading clubs increased from 400 in the mid-1880s to over 3,000 in 1914 (Himka 1988: 90). In 1893, the use of Ukrainian

vernacular was permitted in schools, and the message of Ukrainian cultural distinctiveness, loyalty to Vienna and opposition to Russians and Poles, the purported twin enemies of Ukrainian national liberty, was penetrating far and wide across eastern Galicia.

Imperial borderlands in Ukraine consisted of several different regions—Galicia and Bukovina on the Austrian side, and Volhynia, Podolia, and Bessarabia on the Russian. As can be seen in Table 1, each of these regions has a slightly different institutional trajectory between 1772 and 1944. On the Austrian side, local elites in Bukovina were Romanian, not Polish like in Galicia, although key institutional starting conditions were identical across all five regions before 1772. Important differences between Galicia and Bukovina began to emerge in the 19th century when the Greek Catholic church came to prominence as an identity building institution. Galicia and Bukovina were part of the same administrative unit until 1854 and subject to identical policies, notably on schooling, throughout the 19th century. However, where Bukovina differed from Galicia was on religion. Unlike Ukrainians of Galicia who were subject to ministrations of state-sponsored Greek Catholic priests, Ukrainian residents of Bukovina practiced the Orthodox rite. The Orthodox church never fell under the sway of the Austrian state to the same degree as Greek Catholicism because of the Orthodox tradition's indirect dependence on Russia as the alleged successor to Byzantium,² and Orthodox priests in Bukovina did not play an important role in the project of political identity building. As a result, Ukrainians of Bukovina were subject to the same identity-building treatment as their neighbors in Galicia minus exposure to the Greek Catholic church. This meant that the identity

² Orthodox Bukovinians were subject to the authority of Romanian, not Russian, church authorities. Nevertheless, the two churches maintained close cultural links.

building treatment in Bukovina was weaker. I will demonstrate later how that resulted in less independentist views in Bukovina in the 21st century.

[TABLE 1]

In contrast to the situation in the Austrian empire, modernity arrived late to Russian imperial domains in Ukraine because of Russia's low state capacity³ and also because Russian authorities were generally reluctant for policy reasons to engage in any identity building projects until the very end of the 19th century. This meant that Ukrainians of the Russian empire were subject to no more than an incipient pro-Russian identity-building treatment prior to 1918. Greek Catholicism was outlawed in 1839, all publications in Ukrainian were banned in 1863, and use of Ukrainian vernacular was explicitly prohibited in 1875. Ukrainian provinces were denied both local self-government and state-funded schooling until 1911 (Weeks 2008: 145). In other words, the Russian imperial state systematically rooted out all expressions of a distinctive Ukrainian political identity. As a result, in the first-ever imperial election in 1905 no Ukrainian political party demanded a special status or autonomy for Ukraine. When autonomy was thrust on Ukrainian provinces at the collapse of the Russian empire, local politicians accepted independence reluctantly and only as a result of a direct military threat from advancing Bolshevik armies (Magosci 1996: 480). During World War II, residents of former Russian borderlands were much more willing to join pro-Soviet partisan detachments than their neighbors from former Austrian territories.

State-sponsored identity building arrived in the former Russian possessions in the interwar period. The region of Podolia, which became part of Soviet Ukraine in

³ Russian officialdom was thinly stretched and poorly educated by comparison to its Austrian counterpart. For instance, in 1860 Russia had 1.1. to 1.3 public officials per thousand subjects by comparison to 2.8 in Austria in 1840 and 4.1 in Britain in 1851 (Starr 1972: 48).

1920, was subject to the policy of *korenizatsiia*—promotion of pro-Russian and pro-Communist attitudes alongside nominal advancement of the Ukrainian language and folklore (Martin 2001). Unlike the Austrian 19th century policy of nurturing an independentist Ukrainian political identity, Soviet *korenizatsiia* aimed to bind Ukrainians politically closer to their Greater Russian brethren while allowing them limited and strictly policed cultural autonomy. Schools, including literacy schools for adults, and Communist party organizations were the primary institutional channels that Soviet authorities used to construct this distinctive Russia-friendly Ukrainian political identity. As a result of Soviet forced education campaigns literacy rates among the peasantry in Ukraine shot up from single digits in 1897 to 42% in 1926 and 98% in 1938 (Magosci 1996: 543, 564).⁴ Of all five regions, Podolia was the one that received the strongest pro-Russian treatment as a composite of 19th century imperial and interwar Soviet policies. As will become apparent in the results section, Podolia today remains the most pro-Russian region

The region of Volhynia became part of newly independent Poland between the world wars and during this time was subject to an incomplete pro-Polish and anti-Russian identity-building treatment, what in Table 1 I call a moderate pro-Polish treatment. In a set of policies that were officially called “the Volhynia Experiment,” Polish authorities explicitly copied the institutional design of Soviet *korenizatsiia* policy but filled it with anti-Soviet substance. Using Orthodox churches, schools, and political parties, the Polish government sought to instill pro-Polish and anti-Russian attitudes among the Ukrainian inhabitants of Volhynia in an effort to create a buffer against possible Soviet aggression (Snyder 2005).

⁴ The figures for the 1920s and 1930s are likely inflated, but they provide a general sense for how rapid the increase in literacy was.

The same policy was attempted in the former Austrian province of Galicia, but there it did not take root because the independentist identity there was already well established. Ukrainians of Galicia did not join political parties sponsored by Poles, and most rank-and-file Greek Catholic priests actively resisted what they perceived as Polonization of their rite. Volhynia then is something of an odd case: in the 19th century it was subject to tentative efforts by Russian authorities to build a pro-Russian political identity and then in the interwar period to relatively short-lived but intensive efforts to establish an anti-Russian identity. Today, Ukrainians of Volhynia are mostly situated half way between the two ideal cases of Galicia and Podolia in terms of their attitudes toward Russia and Ukrainian nationalism.

In the interwar period, the region of Bessarabia, like Austrian Bukovina, fell under Romanian control. Starting in the early 1920s, the Romanian government began to make attempts to Romanianize Ukrainian inhabitants of Bessarabia and Bukovina by banning Ukrainian-language schooling and applying pressure on local Orthodox priests to use Romanian in their sermons. Both of these initiatives failed in the former imperial borderlands where ethnic Ukrainians were settled compactly because of interwar Romania's lack of state capacity. Ukrainian remained the dominant language of instruction in primary schools, and private Ukrainian-language secondary schools were established to cater to older students (Magosci 1996). In the domain of religion, Orthodox priests of Ukrainian ethnicity refused to sermonize in Romanian, and, importantly, Orthodox Ukrainians maintained the Julian calendar by contrast to Romanian Orthodox churches that switched over to the modern Gregorian calendar (Rus 2008). In short, the interwar Romanian state failed to leave a substantial imprint

on the political identities of the Ukrainians of northern Bessarabia or neighboring northern Bukovina. This meant that Ukrainians of northern Bessarabia developed their political identity mostly under the tutelage of Soviet authorities in 1940-41 and after 1944. As I will demonstrate momentarily, this makes this population strongly pro-Russian in the contemporary period.

V. SURVEY

The core dependent variable—contemporary differences in political attitudes and voter behavior—is measured via a survey that I designed and launched in the field in the spring and summer of 2009. My key priority in designing the sampling frame was to hold everything constant other than the historical treatments. Therefore, I sampled settlements located *no further than 15 miles* (25 kilometers) from the defunct Austrian-Russian imperial border. That way I was able to control for possible differences in soil fertility, type of agriculture, availability of economic opportunities and infrastructure, and other related variables.

[MAP 2]

To facilitate sub-regional analyses I divided the survey zone into sixteen roughly equally sized segments (see Map 2). All the odd numbered segments are in the former Austrian zone, where segments 1 to 13 correspond to the historical region of Galicia, and segment 15 to northern Bukovina. On the even-numbered Russian side, segments 2 to 10 denote historical Volhynia, 12 and 14 Podolia, and 16 Bessarabia. Contemporary county (*oblast'*) boundaries fall along the historical imperial border for most of its length, and this might potentially confound the effect of the 19th century frontier. To get around this problem I oversampled the three matching segment pairs (7 & 8, 9 & 10, and 15 & 16) where the imperial frontier does

not coincide with a contemporary administrative boundary. Overall, 1,675 respondents were interviewed in 232 villages and 15 towns. Given that there are 613,000 residents on the Austrian side of the survey zone and 635,000 on the Russian, I used the population-proportionate-to-size (PPS) sampling method to randomly select 121 Austrian and 126 Russian settlements.⁵ Individual respondents were selected at random from a database of street addresses.

VI. RESULTS

It is very cumbersome to present results for all five historical regions separately for reasons of space and clarity. To get around this problem I aggregate the data into two survey strata: Austrian and Russian. This introduces a downward bias in estimation of the magnitude of treatment effects. The Austrian stratum consists of settlements from Galicia and Bukovina, but only Galicia received the full institutional treatment of both the Greek Catholic church and Austrian schooling. Likewise, the Russian stratum combines data from Podolia, Volhynia, and Bessarabia, but Volhynia was subject to an anti-Russian treatment during the interwar period. When examining the effectiveness of historical treatments it is therefore useful to bear in mind that the effect of a “complete” Austrian or Russian treatment is likely greater than suggested by these coefficients. Toward the end of this section, I disaggregate the sample into smaller sub-units in order to test hypotheses that require analyses below the crude level of just the two strata. Another thing to note is that most results are presented as simple differences of means as has become standard practice in experimental political science. This style of presentation is justified by the fact that the populations of

⁵ I did, however, exclude two major cities in the Austrian stratum (Ternopil and Chernivtsi, both county capitals) because (1) there were no cities of a matching size in the Russian stratum, and (2) cities in Austrian Galicia were historically settled by Poles and Jews, and only after World War II were populated by Ukrainian and Russian labor migrants.

former Austrian and Russian borderlands are largely identical on basic covariates as shown below. Treatment effects are robust to regression analyses that include all control variables as covariates.⁶

(i) Descriptive Statistics

This study is premised on the assumption that respondents on either side of the defunct Austrian-Russian imperial border are identical to one another on all characteristics other than those that have to do with the effect of historical treatments. This assumption is borne out by the data as reported in Table 2. An identical percentage of respondents in both strata (94%) self-identifies as ethnically Ukrainian. There are also no statistically significant differences between the two populations when it comes to income and education levels, age, and gender. The average respondent is a middle-aged female villager with incomplete secondary education and sufficient income to cover basic needs. Over 70% of respondents in both strata live in villages. The Austrian stratum appears to be more rural than the Russian, but a difference of six percentage-points, while statistically significant, is not substantively important.

[TABLE 2]

In the first half of the 20th century, Ukraine experienced two world wars, a civil war, and mass deportations. Before I claim any continuity of political identities it is important to ascertain what percentage of the current population can be traced back to historical residents of the imperial borderlands. Population stability levels are surprisingly high given all the disruptions that this area experienced: 60% of respondents in the Austrian and 72% in the Russian stratum trace their family roots back at least 100 years in their respective regions. The fact that this number is lower

⁶ Results available from the author on request.

on the Austrian side is an artifact of the early Soviet period. When ethnic Ukrainians from eastern Poland were being exchanged for ethnic Poles from western Ukraine in the population transfers of 1944-46, many more of them settled in former Austrian territories thus tipping the settler-native balance a little more in favor of settlers there.⁷

[TABLE 3]

Some preliminary information on the impact of historical treatments can be found in Table 3, which demonstrates that contemporary residents of Austrian and Russian strata are different in their religious and linguistic practices. The Greek Catholic church that was pivotal in the process of political identity construction in the 19th and early 20th centuries was banned by Soviet authorities in 1946 and returned to Ukraine officially only in 1989. Nevertheless, forty-seven percent of respondents in the Austrian stratum (and 55% of the residents of historical Galicia) switched back to the faith of their forebears following Ukraine's independence. Respondents in the Russian stratum have remained predominantly Orthodox. As to linguistic practices, while large majorities on both sides of the defunct border communicate in Ukrainian, residents of former Russian settlements are by 11 percentage-points more likely to use some mixture of Ukrainian and Russian.

(ii) Substantive similarities across survey strata

If the account of identity construction that I advance here is correct, then contemporary differences between Austrian and Russian strata must be confined primarily to issues relating to Ukrainian nationalism and attitudes toward Russia. It is therefore useful to ask whether the two populations are similar, as I would hypothesize them to be, on attitudes and behaviors that are not directly related to the core dependent variable. The survey instrument contains 106 questions; over half of

⁷ 210,000 Ukrainians from eastern Poland were settled in Lviv and Ternopil oblast against only 39,000 in Khmelnytskyi oblast. Source: Fond 1, opys 23, sprava 4963, Central State Archive of Civil Society Organizations (TsDAHO).

these test hypotheses concerning legacies of historical political identities, but there are also several questions about general attitudes toward society, politics, and economics. Overall, the two populations are indistinguishable in terms of their support for democracy, levels of generalized trust and trust in specific government institutions, preferences for redistribution, and economic beliefs.

[FIGURE 1]

By way of an illustration, in Figure 1, I plot differences of means between the two sets of settlements on four representative questions about politics and economics. Dots represent difference of means coefficients where higher numbers mean that more residents of Austrian settlements subscribe to the given position. Solid lines around coefficients denote the 95% confidence intervals; the difference of means between populations is not statistically significant where solid lines intersect with the x-axis. Equal numbers, almost 96%, on both sides of the defunct imperial border favor greater income redistribution, and 50% of respondents irrespective of location support state ownership of land and industry in the abstract.⁸ Likewise, equally large majorities (70%) in both strata think that individuals cannot bring about political change on their own. Around 40% of respondents acknowledge that they would pay a bribe if solicited by a government official. Notably, residents of former Austrian settlements are six percentage-points more likely to bribe than their neighbors from the Russian side. When considered together, these results suggest that at least in its Ukrainian borderlands the Austrian empire did not leave a legacy of respect for democracy, the rule of law, or a culture of entrepreneurialism (for a contrasting

⁸ When respondents are reminded that state ownership is associated with the Soviet past in a question about support for reintroduction of collective farming, respondents in the Austrian stratum are 12 percentage-points less likely to endorse the principle of state ownership. This difference is statistically significant.

account see Becker et al. 2011). Thus, the story that the data tell is not one of Western modernity opposed to Russian backwardness.

(iii) Key findings

Hypothesis 1 stipulates that evidence of contemporary differences in political attitudes and behavior in the two populations that reside within 15 miles to either side of the defunct Austrian-Russian imperial border is indicative of persistence of historical political identities. Given the nature of historical identity building treatments—Austrian authorities nurturing an independentist Ukrainian political identity in their territories, and Russian/Soviet authorities creating a population loyal to Russia in theirs—contemporary differences between the two sets of respondents ought to revolve around attitudes toward Russia and the Ukrainian national idea. I expect those residing in the former Austrian territories to hold negative attitudes toward Russia because starting in 1939 Soviet authorities made a concerted effort to suppress the independentist Ukrainian identity and replace it with one subservient to the Greater Russian cause—this must have aggrieved an independentist-minded Ukrainian (Slezkine 1991). By contrast, residents of former Russian territories should be more positively predisposed toward Russia because they never had a chance to develop a strong independentist identity in the first place.

[TABLE 4]

The data bear out these expectations as I demonstrate in Table 4. The majority of respondents in the Russian stratum (52%) think that Ukraine's future lies with Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as opposed to Europe; they are 28 percentage-points more likely to advocate a future with Russia than their neighbors in the former Austrian settlements, where only 25% favor closer relations with Russia. The substantive significance of this finding requires no elaboration given

the violent events of 2013-14 when hundreds of ordinary Ukrainians died fighting in part in an attempt to define their country's foreign policy orientation. Differences in foreign policy preferences also influence voting behavior. Connection between the two phenomena makes sense given that the question of Ukraine's relations with Russia has dominated the country's political discourse at least since the Orange Revolution of 2004. In the 2007 parliamentary election—the most recent election before the survey went in the field in 2009—respondents in the Austrian stratum were 11 percentage-points more likely to vote for Viktor Yushchenko's Our Ukraine party. Our Ukraine ran on an explicitly nationalist and ostensibly anti-Russian platform.

Consistent with hypothesis 1, the two populations also assess the recent past in very different ways. For instance, residents of the Austrian stratum are 28 percentage-points more likely to praise Stepan Bandera, the founder of the Ukrainian Insurgency Army (UIA)—an organization that fought against Poles, Germans, and Russians at various times for the cause of Ukrainian independence. Notably, since Ukraine's independence in 1991 Bandera has generally received positive coverage in history textbooks and the media—this explains why the majority of respondents in former Russian settlements (51%) also think of him as a national hero. Yet, even despite recent positive coverage, residents of the Russian stratum are still much less likely to think favorably of Bandera. By contrast, whereas only a minority of those living in former Russian settlements think of Vladimir Lenin, the founder of Bolshevism and the ideological father of brutal collectivization campaigns, as a negative figure (44%), 68% of those in the Austrian stratum think that Lenin's legacy in Ukraine is negative. When it comes to the assessment of Lenin's role in Ukraine's history, the difference between the two strata is 24 percentage-points.

Differences across the long-defunct imperial border transcend attitudes toward deceased political figures. One question that has been hotly disputed in Ukraine over the past decade concerns the practical issue of whether the UIA veterans ought to be granted similar benefits to those veterans who fought for the Soviet army. While majorities in both strata favor treating the two groups equally, residents of Austrian settlements are 21 percentage-points more likely to endorse equal treatment for UIA veterans. It bears highlighting that the magnitude of all of these differences is especially striking given the fact that survey respondents live in an immediate proximity of one another divided by an imaginary line that lost its function almost one hundred years ago. To reiterate, all of the differences described in this section are robust to regression analyses that include all the control variables.

It is natural to wonder whether the findings might be driven by older generations—those who themselves had been directly exposed to, say, Polish or Russian interwar treatments or who are most proximate in age to the Austrian imperial treatment. As hypothesis 2 stipulates, if I am to argue that effects of historical treatments have *persisted* into the present I would need to demonstrate that the young are as likely as the old to ascribe to characteristic political attitudes or exhibit behaviors associated with a specific treatment. To explore how political attitudes vary with age I created six clusters within each survey stratum for individuals aged from 18 to 77 moving at ten-year intervals (18 to 27, 28 to 37... 68 to 77). I clustered respondents in this way in order to improve estimand precision for each age group; there are 110-150 individuals within each of the clusters. For every dependent variable reported in Table 4 I then estimated how predicted probability of

holding a particular attitude changes within every age cluster as one moves from the Austrian to the Russian survey zone. These estimates are marginal effects derived from a probit regression that includes all the control variables described earlier and set at their means. I plot the predicted probabilities of endorsing a future with Russia/CIS by age cluster in Figure 2. The Russian stratum is the top line (represented by triangles); vertical lines are 95% confidence intervals.

[FIGURE 2]

Within each of the survey strata none of the differences between age groups are statistically significant from one other. This means that respondents between ages 18 and 27 and 68 to 77 are equally pro-Russian in the Russian stratum and equally anti-Russian in the Austrian stratum. *Across* the two strata, estimands in the Russian stratum are statistically different from estimands in the Austrian stratum at $p < 0.05$ and vice versa. In short, when it comes to attitudes toward Russia, respondents, irrespective of age, are always statistically indistinguishable from residents of settlements located on their side of the defunct imperial border and always statistically different from residents of settlements located on the opposite side of the border. This pattern is replicated in the case of all the other dependent variables other than voting. When it comes to voting, older people in both strata appear to be statistically more likely than young people to support Our Ukraine, although people in the Russian zone still vote consistently differently from those in the Austrian. This probably indicates that while younger people share identical attitudes with their elders, the young are more likely to vote based on economic consideration and less out of loyalty to a group. It is worth stressing how surprising it is that individuals separated by 50 years of history should hold identical political attitudes and, more importantly, that young people who received identical education but reside on different sides of a long defunct

imperial border should be different from one another. This finding, perhaps more than any other, demonstrates the substantial power of historical political identities.

The theory of identity persistence that I proposed is premised on the idea that political attitudes and behavior associated with historical identities persist as long as social networks within which these identities are embedded survive. This suggests that those individuals who are best integrated into local networks are most likely to be the carriers of dominant attitudes and behavior. In this survey, there are three variables that can potentially shed light on the degree of respondents' integration into local social networks: whether respondents are residents of towns or villages (the assumption being that social networks in towns are looser), whether they were born in the settlement where they are being interviewed (presumably picking up on long-term association with the community), and whether they can trace their family roots back at least 100 years on the relevant side of the defunct imperial border. All three variables are summarized in Table 2. If hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c are correct, and the level of integration into the local community matters then those respondents with stronger community bonds should be more pro-Russian on the Russian side and more anti-Russian on the Austrian side.

To test these hypotheses I ran probit regressions predicting respondents' positions on all five dependent variables in order to estimate marginal effects for each community bond variable. These regressions include all the standard controls set to their mean and a binary variable for survey stratum. For each stratum I then calculated predicted probabilities of holding a particular attitude for those who are well integrated into local communities and those who are not. Given that there are two

imperial strata, three measures of the strength of community bonds, and five dependent variables, it is too cumbersome to present each predicted probability separately and then analyze the differences within each relevant pair. Instead, in Table 5 I simply present the differences between two predicted probabilities and report whether that difference is statistically significant. The expectation is that if the strength of community bonds matters then the difference within each pair must be statistically significant. Furthermore, individuals who are better integrated into their respective communities—village residents, those who today live in same settlements where they had been born, and those who have long family pedigree on the relevant side of the imperial border—must be more anti-Russian in the Austrian stratum and more pro-Russian in the Russian stratum.⁹

[TABLE 5]

The overall impression from these results is that the level of respondent integration into the local community does not appear to affect attitudes toward Russia or perception of the past. Of the total of 30 differences of means in the table, only 13 have signs consistent with expectations, and of these 13, only one is statistically significant (negative relationship between having deep family roots on the Austrian side and believing that Ukraine's future lies with Russia). More often than not, the magnitude of differences in attitudes between respondents with strong and weak community bonds is small, statistically insignificant, or wrongly signed. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the data do not bear out the theoretical expectation that individuals with strong community bonds must also be more faithful to the dominant

⁹ Here is a brief illustration of how to interpret the coefficients in Table 5. The predicted probability that a town resident in the Austrian stratum would favor closer relations with Russia is 0.23; the corresponding predicted probability for village residents in the Austrian stratum is 0.26. Subtracting 0.26 from 0.23 we get -0.03, which is the coefficient that's reported in Table 5. Using the adjusted Wald test I ask whether the difference between these two predicted probabilities is statistically significant. In this instance, the two predicted probabilities are statistically indistinguishable from one another at $p = 0.51$.

historical political identity. It is possible that the nature of community bonds is poorly measured. There are no major cities in the area covered by the survey, and therefore the comparison between villages and towns is really one of relatively small villages to relatively large ones. Having been born in a settlement is not the same as spending the whole of one's life there; it is conceivable that late in life people move back to places where they had been born. Furthermore, the variable measuring family roots is likely substantially underestimated because many respondents had difficulty thinking several family generations back.

While acknowledging that community bond measures are noisy, I favor a different explanation based on these results and my ethnographic work. I think it is likely that outsiders relatively quickly conform to the locally dominant political identity and overtime become indistinguishable from long-term local residents. This kind of conformity probably does not take place in cities, but these are absent from my sample. It is also likely that those who fail to conform eventually move on to settle elsewhere. This is just one possible interpretation of the data and is something that requires further study.

VII. DISCUSSION

Evidence demonstrates that individuals who reside on the former Russian side of the historical border that has been defunct since 1918 are more pro-Russian than their immediate neighbors from former Austrian settlements. The two populations have conflicting political identities: they assess Ukraine's recent history in different ways, disagree over what Ukraine's political future should be, and vote for different political parties.

These differences in attitudes and behavior are consistent with the theoretical account that I presented of persistence of competing historical political identities. It is impossible to trace every link in a causal chain that connects Greek Catholic churches and Austrian schools in the 1850s and 1860s to contemporary political attitudes in the former Austrian borderlands in western Ukraine. For one, individuals that were subject to original treatments are long deceased. The best I can do in this format is to rule out alternative explanations for the observed variation.

First, though, an observation concerning the stability of borderland populations. One common criticism of this study is that there might be something unique about communities that live close to a state boundary. It seems reasonable to expect there to have been quite a lot of mobility across the imperial frontier: people traveling to markets, intermarrying, etc. It should also have been relatively easy for villagers to flee from economic hardship by simply crossing the border. First, if anything, the fact of historical population mobility enhances my findings. If individuals exposed to different historical treatments intermingled, then treatment effectiveness was presumably reduced. The fact that we can observe persistent differences today is then a testament to the immense power of historical identity building treatments.

[TABLE 6]

Second, and more importantly, the historical record suggests that population mobility was in fact low, at least starting in the mid-19th century. Around that time Austria and Russia started to perceive each other as geopolitical rivals, and the border-crossing regime was tightened (Wandycz 1974). It is therefore not surprising

that close to 70% of respondents can trace their roots in the same province going over 100 years back (see Table 2). Furthermore, in the first decades of the 20th century close to 90% of all marriages in these borderland settlements were between individuals who resided in the same empire, as can be seen in Table 6 where I ask respondents about the origin of their grandparents. Only 4% of respondents in the Russian stratum and 7% in the Austrian report that at least one of their grandparents was born on the opposite side of the imperial border. Ethnographic evidence suggests that intermarriage rates across what is now just an imaginary line remain very low; such marriages started becoming a little more common only in the 1980s, some 60 years after Austrian and Russian empires had disappeared. Durable differences in political identities appear to have prevented cultural and family exchanges.

(i) *Alternative explanations*

The two dominant alternative explanations for the variation in political attitudes and behavior that I have described center on more proximate causes than 19th century empires. It might be argued that variation in attitudes toward Russia is a product of inter-war institutional dynamics or events during World War II (WWII) and the war's immediate aftermath. The first thing to note is that my theory of identity building assigns significance to empires only insofar as empires are synonymous with institutional attempts to mold a particular type of political identity. As I have argued in the section on historical treatments, only the Austrian empire satisfies this condition. Identity construction did not begin in earnest in the former Russian territories until the interwar period. Nevertheless, if it could be shown that the Polish interwar treatment can explain *all* the variation on the dependent variable then my theory would obviously be faulty, as the preceding Austrian treatment would be found to have no independent effect.

[TABLE 7]

It is often impossible to disentangle causal influences of historical processes that are sequential: in this instance, the Polish interwar treatment following on from the Austrian imperial treatment. In this project, though, I am able to separately assess the magnitude of each treatment because the survey zone is made up of five distinct regions, each with a different historical trajectory in the interwar period (see Table 1). To find out whether imperial institutional treatments left a lasting legacy I create binary variables for exposure to Austrian and Russian empires and separately to Poland in the interwar period. I then interact these variables and am left with a dummy for the population that experienced Austria and Poland (corresponds to the historical region of Galicia) and one for the population that had been exposed to Russian and Polish rule (historical region of Volhynia). I then include these interaction terms as independent variables alongside all the standard controls in probit regressions that seek to predict outcomes on each of the five dependent variables. As a result, I am able to ask whether deeper imperial legacies have an independent effect *controlling for experiencing Polish institutions in the interwar period*. The answer is presented in the first row of Table 7 as a difference in the predicted probability of holding a particular attitude between respondents in the Austrian and Russian strata controlling for interwar Poland. Coefficients reported in this table are the differences in two predicted probabilities; whether the difference between the two predicted probabilities is statistically significant is indicated conventionally by the number of stars. The presentation here is identical to one used in Table 5. These results demonstrate clearly that the deeper imperial legacy does matter: controlling for Polish interwar influence, respondents in the Austrian stratum consistently exhibit anti-Russian attitudes that are both substantial in magnitude and statistically significant.

This is not to argue that the Polish interwar treatment has no effect at all. In row two of Table 7 I compare the impact of the Polish and Soviet interwar treatments while controlling for the deeper Russian imperial legacy; this is effectively a comparison of Volhynia to Podolia in a regression context. The Polish interwar identity building does appear to be highly effective at instilling anti-Russian attitudes, even if a little less so than the Austrian imperial treatment (difference of means coefficients are consistently larger in row one). Residents of settlements that were part of Poland are consistently more anti-Russian than those who reside in communities that had been exposed to Soviet institutions in the interwar period. It is interesting to note that the population that had been exposed to Polish institutions holds an especially poor opinion of Vladimir Lenin, the founder of Bolshevism.

One historical period that I have not touched on over the course of this article is World War II; in fact, WWII is omitted from Table 1. I excluded WWII on twin assumptions that institutional treatments cannot be effective during wartime because of the general chaos accompanying a major conflict and that populations on both sides of the defunct imperial border had suffered more or less equally. These simplifying assumptions are problematic. In September 1939, Nazi Germany and Soviet Union dismembered Poland. Soviet authorities took over ethnic Ukrainian territories that had been part of Poland in the interwar period. Between September 1939 and the German invasion of the USSR in July 1941, the Soviets attempted to collectivize and generally Sovietize Galicia and Volhynia (Snyder 2011). Tens of thousands of anti-Soviet objectors were arrested, and many were killed or deported. Even more problematically for my argument, when the Soviet Union returned to western Ukraine

in 1944 it began a campaign to exterminate Ukrainian nationalists that resulted in killings and mass deportations and ended only in 1950. Throughout this period, the Soviets were forcibly collectivizing western Ukraine. These events took place within the living memory of some of the older respondents in my survey. Might it be that differences in attitudes toward Russia are due not to deeper legacies, as I have argued, but are rather a product of the fact that in the 1940s Soviet authorities treated the residents of Galicia and Volhynia especially poorly?

The first thing to note is that Ukrainians of interwar Polish territories were not the only ones to experience Soviet brutality. Those Ukrainians who ended up in the Soviet Union in the interwar period had also experienced their fair share of suffering as a result of forced collectivization, the hunger extermination campaign of 1932-1933 (Holodomor), and Stalinist repressions of 1937-1940. This does not detract from the fact that the experience of Soviet brutality in western Ukraine is more recent and therefore perhaps more memorable for survey respondents. What my research in Communist party archives indicates is that in 1939-1950 Soviet officials treated all Ukrainian residents of interwar Polish territories with identical brutality; they did not discriminate between the residents of Volhynia and Galicia. This means that the Polish interwar treatment is synonymous with Soviet wartime repression. If the memory of Soviet brutality is the single cause of anti-Russian attitudes, then all Ukrainian residents of interwar Poland must be identically anti-Russian irrespective of which imperial treatment they had been exposed to previously. Yet, I demonstrate in Table 7 that controlling for exposure to interwar Poland deeper legacies of empire are responsible for major variation in anti-Russian attitudes. In short, deeper imperial legacies do have an effect. Where I do run into trouble is in the fact that I am not able

to distinguish between Polish institutional treatment and Soviet wartime brutality. This means that I am not able to definitively isolate the single cause behind the substantive effects shown in row two of Table 7. These effects are likely a product of both the interwar Polish treatment and wartime Soviet brutality. Generally, I am inclined to give primacy to Polish institutions because Ukrainian communities under interwar Soviet tutelage also suffered greatly under Soviet rule, and therefore the Soviet brutality explanation appears to be less convincing.

(ii) Broader implications

It is tempting to dismiss political identity dynamics in western Ukraine as an aberration of sorts. Communities in former imperial borderlands are predominantly rural, and both populations might appear to a Western observer to be unusually stable. Moreover, it could well be that the very reason that historical identities persisted into the present was because Soviet authorities tried so very hard to eradicate them. Through institutional and cultural efforts to eradicate historical identities, Soviet authorities might have propped up their salience. I am not able to assess empirically how important Soviet oppression was to persistence of an Austrian-forged political identity because in this project I do not have a comparable case where state attempts to change dominant historical identities were absent. Like any experimental and quasi-experimental research, this project prompts difficult questions about external validity of the findings.

My hunch is that these findings are generalizable, and historical political identities still today play a pivotal role in shaping attitudes and behavior both in developing and developed countries from the post-colonial settings of Asia (Lankina and Getachew 2011), Africa (Lee and Schultz 2012), and Latin America (Woodberry

2012) to the culture of honor in the US South (Acharya et al. 2014). Many states—most colonial states that went beyond simple rent extraction in their foreign possessions—and organizations (especially religious groups and political parties) historically made concerted efforts to instill particular political identities among subjects in their charge. These identities are structurally similar to ones I uncovered in western Ukraine. Furthermore, one of the basic characteristics of historical identities is that they eventually come under attack, just like the Austrian-created anti-Russian identity came under attack from Soviet authorities in western Ukraine. Newly minted post-colonial regimes frequently try to uproot previously dominant colonial identities, and economic and religious identities are also challenged eventually as they were in the US South. While stable social networks are likely necessary for successful persistence and replication of historical identities, such stability is not unique to rural settings. All in all, alongside more conventional research on path dependent evolution of formal institutions there is a great deal of fruitful work to be done on how historical political identities shape contemporary variation in attitudes and behavior.

VIII. CONCLUSION

I have demonstrated that certain types of political attitudes and behaviors persist long after formal institutions that originally gave rise to these identities have disappeared. I have shown how exposure to 19th century institutions of the Austrian Empire promoting an independentist Ukrainian political identity has ensured that throughout the 20th century and into the present a segment of the western Ukrainian population has retained a strong anti-Russian and anti-Soviet political identity. Taking the accident of the partitions of Poland in the late 18th century as an opportunity to isolate the causal effect of different types of historical institutions, I have described why

residents of neighboring settlements located on different sides of a long-defunct Austrian-Russian imperial border still today vote differently and hold conflicting foreign policy preferences. These findings provide the much-needed historical context for understanding violent disagreement among Ukrainians over the country's future policy and cultural orientation.

More broadly, this paper is a call for renewed attention to the rigorous study of persistent political identities and processes of political socialization. My findings suggest a major corrective to the way we think about political behavior and institutional evolution, and it is of relevance to the literatures on democratization, economic growth, and political choice among others. If very sticky political attitudes play an important role in shaping behaviors like engagement with formal institutions and voting, then our focus should be less on the low-hanging fruit of formal rules and increasingly on the evolution of informal institutions and conditions under which political identities change. I do not seek to argue that historical political identities are capable of explaining all the variation on important attitudes and behavior that we care about as social scientists. Rather, I demonstrate that historical political identities might matter a lot under some conditions and therefore merit careful additional study in the context of both developing and developed countries.

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FIGURES AND TABLES:

MAP 1: RUSSIAN-AUSTRIAN IMPERIAL BORDERLANDS, LATE 18TH-EARLY 20TH CENTURIES.



TABLE 1:
NATURE OF HISTORICAL TREATMENTS AND EXPECTED CONTEMPORARY OUTCOMES

Period 1: Prior to 1772			Period 2: 1772-1918*		Period 3: 1918-1939		Period 4: 1944-present		Expected Outcome
	<i>Country</i>	<i>Nature of Treatment</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Nature of Treatment</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Nature of Treatment</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Nature of Treatment</i>	
GALICIA	Poland	none	Austrian Empire	independentist (strong)	Poland	pro-Polish (failed)	Ukraine	pro-Russian	anti-Russian sentiment
PODOLIA	Poland	none	Russian Empire	pro-Russian (weak)	Soviet Ukraine	pro-Russian (strong)	Ukraine	pro-Russian	pro-Russian sentiment
VOLHYNIA	Poland	none	Russian Empire	pro-Russian (weak)	Poland	pro-Polish (moderate)	Ukraine	pro-Russian	moderate pro- Russian sentiment
BUKOVINA	Romania	none	Austrian Empire	independentist (moderate)	Romania	pro-Romanian (v. weak)	Ukraine	pro-Russian	moderate anti- Russian sentiment
BESSARABIA	Romania	none	Russian Empire	pro-Russian (weak)	Romania	pro-Romanian (v. weak)	Ukraine	pro-Russian	pro-Russian sentiment

* This time bracket represents the longest period of imperial tutelage (corresponds to Austrian Galicia). Russia acquired Podolia and Volhynia in 1795, and Bessarabia in 1812.

MAP 2: SURVEY ZONE




TABLE 2:
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES

	Austrian area	Russian area	Magnitude of differences
Age (years)	50 (0.64)	49 (0.64)	0.50
Women (%)	0.62 (0.02)	0.62 (0.02)	0.00
Income ^a (5-point scale)	2.80 (0.03)	2.79 (0.03)	0.01
Education (years)	6.44 (0.09)	6.27 (0.09)	0.17
Self-identify as Ukrainian (%)	0.94 (0.01)	0.94 (0.01)	0.00
<i>Depth of local roots:</i>			
Reside in villages (%)	0.76 (0.01)	0.70 (0.02)	0.06**
Reside in settlement of birth (%)	0.60 (0.02)	0.60 (0.02)	0.00
Family roots in province for over 100 years (%)	0.65 (0.02)	0.76 (0.02)	0.11**
N	830	845	1675

* p < 0.05

** p < 0.01;

^a Income is measured on a five-point scale where 1 is the lowest level and 5 the highest.

TABLE 3:
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON LINGUISTIC AND RELIGIOUS VARIABLES

	Austrian area	Russian area	Magnitude of differences
<i>Language:</i>			
Only Ukrainian	0.91 (0.01)	0.81 (0.01)	0.10**
Some mixture of Ukrainian & Russian	0.03 (0.01)	0.14 (0.01)	0.11**
<i>Religion:</i>			
Orthodox	0.46 (0.02)	0.88 (0.01)	0.42**
Greek Catholic	0.47 (0.02)	0.03 (0.01)	0.44**
N	830	845	1675

* p < 0.05

** p < 0.01

FIGURE 1: SIMILARITIES IN POLITICAL PREFERENCES AND BEHAVIOR BETWEEN AUSTRIAN AND RUSSIAN STRATA




TABLE 4:
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SURVEY STRATA ON DEPENDENT VARIABLES

	Austrian area	Russian area	Magnitude of difference
Ukraine's future should be linked with Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (q56)	0.25 (0.02)	0.52 (0.02)	0.28**
Voted for Viktor Yushchenko's Our Ukraine party in 2007 parliamentary election (q15)	0.38 (0.02)	0.27 (0.02)	0.11**
Stepan Bandera, founder of the Ukrainian Insurgency Army (UIA), is a national hero (q62)	0.79 (0.01)	0.51 (0.02)	0.28**
Veterans of the UIA should have same as or better benefits than Soviet veterans (q66)	0.87 (0.01)	0.65 (0.02)	0.21**
Vladimir Lenin, the founder of Bolshevism, is an enemy of Ukraine (q63)	0.68 (0.02)	0.44 (0.02)	0.24**
N	830	845	1675

* p < 0.05

** p < 0.01.

FIGURE 2: MARGINAL EFFECT OF AGE ON PRO-RUSSIAN ATTITUDES BY SURVEY ZONE.




TABLE 5:
IMPACT OF COMMUNITY BOND VARIABLES ON
POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR
(Differences in Predicted Probabilities)

	Future with Russia	Voted for Our Ukraine	Bandera is hero	Benefits for UIA veterans	Lenin is enemy
<i>SETTLEMENT TYPE:</i>					
Austria*town –	-0.03	0.02	0.01	-0.02	0.08*
Austria*village					
Russia*town –	0.13*	0.01	0.00	-0.13*	-0.04
Russia*village					
<i>BIRTH PLACE:</i>					
Austria*settborn –	0.00	0.02	-0.04	-0.03	0.01
Austria*others					
Russia*settborn –	0.00	0.09**	0.03	0.02	-0.02
Russia*others					
<i>DEPTH OF ROOTS:</i>					
Austria*rooted –	-0.10***	-0.01	0.05	0.03	0.01
Austria*others					
Russia*rooted –	-0.12*	0.05	0.05	-0.04	-0.02
Russia*others					
N	1422	1441	1373	1236	1464

* p < 0.10

** p < 0.05

***p<0.01

TABLE 6:
ORIGIN OF RESPONDENTS' GRANDPARENTS

	Respondent on Austrian side	Respondent on Russian side
All four grandparents born in the AUSTRIAN EMPIRE	86%	2%
All four grandparents born in the RUSSIAN EMPIRE	7%	94%
At least one grandparent born on OPPOSITE SIDE from respondent	7%	4%
N	709	771

TABLE 7:
ASSESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INTERWAR PERIOD
(Differences in Marginal Effects Between Regions with Different Interwar Histories)

	Future with Russia	Voted for Our Ukraine	Bandera is hero	Benefits for UIA veterans	Lenin is enemy
Austria * Poland – Russia * Poland	-0.23***	0.10***	0.26***	0.19***	0.17***
Russia * Poland – Russia * USSR	-0.21***	0.07*	0.17***	0.11**	0.29***
N	1422	1441	1373	1236	1464

* p < 0.10

** p < 0.05

***p<0.01